for unions and civil rights groups. By putting race at the center, it also suggests an alternative understanding of the twentieth-century American state.
union policy, the outcome of political struggles in the 1930s, crystallized into institutional arrangements that impeded future civil rights reform. By creating multiple institutions that were often in direct conflict with each other, this policy effort ended in unintended and undesirable consequences for labor, civil rights activists, and the Democratic Party's New Deal coalition.
When politicians passed the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Wagner Act) in 1935, they did not include antidiscrimination measures fought for by civil rights groups. The Democratic Party's reliance on southern segregationists to achieve legislative goals prohibited any type of civil rights policy. To rectify this failure, the government neither reformed the NLRA nor instituted changes through the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), but instead responded with a series of "patchwork" reforms, creating new agencies at different historical moments with varying powers.
2 No one agency was given total control or adequate weapons to accomplish civil rights reform in labor unions. By the late 1960s, the federal government's handling of union discrimination had become one of "patterned anarchy," as multiple agencies were addressing the issue in different ways, working at cross-purposes, and producing inefficient and conflicting policies. 3 Federal courts became most active in resolving the quagmire by punishing resistant unions with often overwhelming financial penalties in the course of courtroom litigation. 4 In the process, however, courts scaled back many important New Deal protections of union workers. Few individuals within the courts or among the myriad bureaucrats involved in this policy struggle were sensitive to the political and financial strain their actions put on the broader labor movement. Thus, the 1960s and 70s was a time period not only when the civil rights movement was having success integrating unions but when unions were losing considerable economic and political clout both with regard to their collective bargaining power vis-à-vis employers and in national politics. 5 Large numbers of white union members voted for George Wallace and Richard Nixon, further weakening the New Deal order and enabling harmful retrenchments by the Republican Party in the areas of both labor and civil rights policy. 6 On the job, this had a very real impact for civil rights economics: while the percentage of African Americans in unions increased, in many industries the overall number of union members, including African American union members, declined. 7 This history of labor civil rights policy also has important implications for scholarship on the American state. First, this historical-institutional account shows that racial hierarchies were central to the foundation of New Deal labor policy, not something that "emerged" in the 1960s to destroy a universally beneficial redistributive program. 8 It was the racially exclusive nature of early twentiethcentury labor policy that necessitated later government action to promote civil rights within the labor movement. It was a further weakness of state actions in the 1960s that forced federal courts and not Congress, the president, or a federal bureaucracy, to be the final arbiter. The end result of these institutional weak-nesses was a confrontation between two causes central to the Democratic Partywhite labor and civil rights groups-and quite arguably neither was left better for it. Second, incorporating race into labor policy necessitates a reconsideration of whether the passage of the Wagner Act was as fundamental to U.S. state building as it is often characterized. Karen Orren, for instance, argues that the Wagner Act dealt the final blow to American-style feudalism and allowed liberalism to flourish as legislative majorities took control of national economic policy away from courts.
9 But because legislative majorities at the time were unable to confront civil rights inequities, courts rather quickly worked their way back into labor policy, doing so in a manner that weakened both legislative and union authority over labor policy. By the 1980s, not only had labor unions declined dramatically as a political and economic force but federal courts had in many ways regained their position as the primary overseer of the workplace, often by interpreting statutes but also by using common law and constitutional rights to overturn statutes and create liberties for individual employees, to the direct detriment of national labor unions. Third, it reminds us that while institutions in important ways structure and place limits on the behavior of political actors, power-and here specifically, racial power-remains an important dimension that shapes policy outcomes. In academic efforts to show how institutions reign in strategic behavior, scholars have increasingly forgotten that power lies underneath these institutions and continually shapes events in a manner that benefits specific groups and interests.
I proceed first with an overview of the historical context in which federal civil rights policy engaged with labor unions. The bulk of the article explores the government's response, beginning with the NLRA of 1935 and then examining subsequent institutional developments involving the expanding use of the Department of Labor (DOL), the formation of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and finally, the active involvement of federal courts. In the conclusion, I return to the theoretical questions raised here and examine the role of race in understanding theories of labor union decline. I argue that while race by no means single-handedly led to union decline, it has been overlooked by scholars as both an independent and contributing force.
THE CONTEXT: UNION DISCRIMINATION, CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIVISM, AND THE NEED FOR A FEDERAL RESPONSE
Over the past decade, labor historians have heatedly debated the existence of racism and civil rights violations in the labor movement and the degree to which white workers were responsible.
10 Much of the scholarship on the labor movement, whether written by historians, social scientists, or legal scholars, ignores questions of race almost entirely, at best presenting it "as an actor in a subplot that can be left on the cutting-room floor without violating the main story."
11 Among those scholars who explore union race problems in greater detail, many argue that it was caused by capitalist dynamics, micro and macro, rather than specific prob-lems of racism in the union community. 12 It is of course true, for instance, that employers and the broader capitalist market have played a major and at times singularly important role in promoting workplace discrimination and segregation. 13 But recent historical treatments have portrayed the labor movement as having a much more extensive race problem that was independent of employer instigations and was not simply isolated to the building trades and the south.
14 Although many national unions were important advocates of the civil rights movement and the passage of the Civil Rights Act, even some of the most progressive unions far underestimated and denied their internal discriminatory problems and were slow to act against it. Race was a fundamental division in the labor movement throughout the twentieth century, and while largely ignored by union leadership for the first six decades of the century, by the early 1960s it had become clear that union leadership lacked both the will and the tools to resolve its problems without outside intervention.
To generalize about labor unions during this time would be foolhardy. Some unions were explicitly segregationist and discriminatory, maintaining white-only hiring standards. 15 In the 1930s, leaders in the American Federation of Labor (AFL) often spoke critically of African Americans as being antiunion and strikebreakers. 16 Other unions were at the forefront in supporting civil rights causes both domestically and internationally. Walter Reuther and Philip Murray, presidents of the United Auto Workers (UAW) and Steelworkers, respectively, had extensive links with civil rights causes, providing financial assistance to and being on the boards of civil rights organizations, and creating internal fair employment committees to examine their own union's race problems.
17 During the 1940s and 1950s, in an effort to combat national union discrimination, the International Lady Garment Workers conducted extensive surveys of racism in its southern unions; more broadly, Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) and communist union organizers were aggressive in the 1940s in organizing black workers in the south. 18 Moreover, even within unions such as the International Boilermakers that had constitutions forbidding the hiring of nonwhite workers, internal rank-and-file efforts had moments of success in bringing about civil rights reform. 19 Civil rights groups stepped up efforts to confront union leaders about racism internal to the movement in the late 1950s and 1960s. Through memos, public protests, and mobilization of all black caucuses and trade union alternatives, civil rights activists made clear to union leaders the scope of the problem. The litany of problems was similar throughout the country: unions were discriminating by explicitly creating racially segregated locals, by implicitly segregating the workforce through different job duties and pay scales, by denying opportunities for apprenticeship training, by maintaining seniority systems that left black workers as the first fired and least powerful, and by excluding minority workers from union leadership positions. 20 Roy Wilkins and Herbert Hill of the NAACP pro-vided national union leaders with extensive testimonies of discrimination. 21 In 1959, A. Phillip Randolph led the formation of the National American Labor Council to demand increased efforts by national unions and the federal government to promote more and more equal jobs for African American workers. 22 Similar organizations popped up throughout the union movement, most notably the Trade Union Leadership Council in the UAW, the National Council of Distributive Workers of America, and the Coalition of Black Trade Unionists. 23 The response of union leaders, whether from the progressive CIO unions or the more conservative building trades, was generally the same: they tried to deny the existence of internal racism as being anything more than incidental, blame its existence on outside forces, or attack the civil rights activists as racists, radicals, and antiunion. 24 When the Civil Rights Committee of the AFL-CIO investigated union racism in 1956, for instance, it focused its attention almost entirely on the Ku Klux Klan's efforts to "chop away union membership from AFL-CIO affiliates" while making no reference to internal union problems. 25 The Steelworkers during the 1950s "rarely, if ever, mentioned combating racism as an objective. Instead, they spoke in vague generalities about the need to 'create a better economic and social climate in which to live.' " 26 When asked about segregated unions in its southern locals in the early 1960s, the Steelworkers blamed it entirely on the employer. 27 The UAW's Reuther was "defensive and maladroit" to attacks from civil rights activists within the union, while its secretary-treasurer Emil Mazey accused the NAACP of misplacing "its criticism of labor for actions which were obviously the sins of management."
28 AFL-CIO president George Meany was consistently ambivalent on civil rights in the union movement. He supported the Civil Rights Act and listened with quiet approval to a public lambasting from NAACP president Roy Wilkins for the continued systematic racism within many AFL-CIO trades.
29 But he also opposed the march on Washington and other civil rights activism, referred often to African Americans as "you people," and responded defensively to accusations of discrimination, from his infamous response at an AFL-CIO convention to A. Philip Randolph ("Who in the hell appointed you as guardian of the Negro members in America") 30 to his claim that federal efforts to attack union discrimination was merely a result of unions being a "whipping boy" designed to offset the shortcomings of others. 31 He, like Reuther and other union leaders, moreover, tended to oppose activism of any kind in the labor movement; civil rights activists were often asking not just for racial equality but for a more radical vision of labor economics. 32 What was clear by the mid-1960s was that national unions had significant race problems and they had not done enough of substance to stop it. 33 Their priority was maintaining union power, and even progressive union leaders such as Reuther endorsed the inclusion of locals into their membership that had constitutions mandating segregation (at the AFL-CIO general counsel meetings, only A. Philip Randolph opposed the affiliation of white-only union locals). As evi-dence and charges surfaced of far more systematic problems, union leaders consistently attempted to brush such charges under the rug. 34 Internal union civil rights committees were largely symbolic: the AFL-CIO Civil Rights Committee was consistently called "a waste of time" and "fruitless," and until the late 1960s it avoided responding to even its most extreme systematic examples of racist hiring practices.
35 Similar committees of the UAW and Steelworkers were focused more on promoting public image than responding to internal matters. 36 By 1968, numerous building trade presidents and members were vocal supporters of George Wallace's presidential campaign, vowing active defiance to even symbolic reform efforts. 37 Federal labor policy, then, developed in this context of a labor movement that was sharply divided along racial lines. Not surprisingly, given the class-first principles of the labor movement and the marginal status of African Americans within it, labor policy began in the 1930s by ignoring race issues. As the civil rights movement confronted workplace inequality and the federal government reacted tepidly, the continuing resistance of unions to civil rights reforms eventually led to the activism of courts and lawyers. In doing so, unions lost control over the way in which integration would take place. Whereas unions had ample influence within the NLRB and DOL, their influence in the courtroom was far less as they found themselves confronted with lawyers and judges who cared little about the future maintenance of unions.
FEDERAL LABOR UNION POLICY-A REFLECTION OF WHITE UNION DOMINANCE
The labor movement's primary focus in the first few decades of the twentieth century was to establish regulatory policies that could prevent employers from firing and blacklisting union organizers, legitimate a degree of union autonomy over its members, and prevent federal courts from issuing injunctions against strike activity and preventing collective action. 38 Prior to the New Deal, labor unions achieved a number of regulatory victories at the state and national level with the Clayton Act, the Railway Labor Act, and the Norris-LaGuardia Act, but not until the Supreme Court's acquiescence to the New Deal regulatory state in NLRB v. Jones 42 led to an era of both union and federal regulatory power. 43 The Wagner Act gave workers the legal right to strike, the right to be protected from discrimination on the basis of their union activity, and the right to enter into collective bargaining agreements, all regulated and enforced by the NLRB. The number of labor unions in the United States rose dramatically after the passage of the act, a tribute to both the law and the initial enforcement practices by the board.
44
The Wagner Act was far less helpful for African American workers. 45 The act was passed at a time when the New Deal legislative agenda was dependent on southern Democrats in Congress for its success, limiting the reach of New Deal programs to help African Americans. 46 Labor legislation, such as the NLRA and the Fair Labor Standards Act, excluded large portions of African American workers, most notably by denying statutory protection to agricultural and domestic workers, effectively excluding roughly two-thirds of the black workforce population. 47 African Americans in the 1930s were woefully underrepresented in the national union movement and were almost nonexistent in its leadership with the exception of the all-black Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters.
48 Numerous national unions discriminated as a matter of policy, and the numbers of African Americans in many union-dominated industries declined even further with the passage of New Deal legislation.
49
This is not to claim, as Gareth Davies and Martha Derthick rightly caution about other elements of the New Deal agenda, that race was the critical factor in the passage of the NLRA. 50 Debates about race and civil rights were almost entirely absent from the legislative floor debates and conference committee hearings. Even on a seemingly certain indicator of southern influence, the notable absence of agricultural and domestic workers from the NLRA, the legislative history reflects very little discussion of the reasons for their exclusion. 51 It seems fairly clear that legislators were more interested in coming up with a piece of legislation that promoted union rights and would survive constitutional scrutiny from the Supreme Court.
52 It was not until two years later, in the debates over the Fair Labor Standards Act, that race and civil rights issues become explicitly linked to the political agenda during on-the-floor legislative discussions. 53 Nonetheless, the Wagner Act had components that were clearly harmful to African Americans and civil rights leaders at the time both recognized these components and explicitly opposed them in letters to elected officials. Elected officials, while rarely raising these matters on the legislative floor, were nonetheless cognizant of the concerns and the fact that they were doing nothing about them. The chief concern of civil rights groups in lobbying on the Wagner Act was not the exclusion of agricultural or domestic workers but the potential impact of Section 9, which empowered unions to have closed shops and be the exclusive collective bargaining agents based on a determination by the majority of workers in a company. Both the NAACP and the National Urban League were in constant contact with Senator Robert Wagner in an effort to change labor legislation. 54 The NAACP complained that unions were using the act "to organize a union for all the white workers, and to either agree with the employers to push Negroes out of the industry or, having effected an agreement with the employer, to proceed to make a union lily-white." 55 The National Urban League argued that the act failed to pro-tect blacks from being excluded from employment by closed shop unions, that it permitted competitive unions in the same industry on the basis of race, and that it excluded blacks who were hired as strikebreakers from employee protection even in situations where their only opportunity to gain work was during a strike period. 56 Both organizations fought to have a civil rights amendment attached to the NLRA-a "duty of fair representation" that would prevent discriminatory unions from representing only white workers. 57 Other local black unions, such as the Colored Railway Trainmen, pushed for a principle of proportional representation in union control. 58 The AFL, according to Wagner aide Leon Keyserling, "fought bitterly" against the inclusion of these provisions and with little African American representation in Congress or in the labor movement, it was soundly defeated without a floor fight.
59
African American lobbyists continued to push for changes to NLRA policy for the next two decades without success. Congress amended the Wagner Act on two major occasions, and neither added the provisions lobbied for by the NAACP and National Urban League. In the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, Senator Taft made this specific when asked to clarify the changes made to the closed shop: "Of course many persons believe that the union shop, which is the usual form of closed shop, should be absolutely prohibited. The committee did not feel that it should go that far. . . . Let us take the case of unions which prohibit the admission of Negroes to membership, they may continue to do so; but representatives of the union cannot go to the employer and say, 'you have got to fire this man because he is not a member of our union. ' " 60 In committee hearings, civil rights leaders were blamed for "frequently making the mistake of being entirely too sensitive about [civil rights] matters" and were told not to "raise these questions because they will destroy the legislation."
61 In 1954, a brief effort to reform Taft-Hartley ended when Democrats offered an amendment that would have made union discrimination an unfair labor practice. 62 During the Landrum Griffin bill in 1959, meanwhile, Adam Clayton Powell raised the issue of racial inequality in congressional debate, only to be denounced and defeated by other House members who claimed he was promoting a "killer" amendment.
63
The NLRB and Civil Rights As mentioned above, the Wagner Act provided the NLRB with cease and desist powers to regulate relations between unions and employers. The Board also has ample authority to determine the scope of its powers on matters such as racial discrimination. While the Board has attempted to maintain itself as a relatively neutral arbiter between unions and employers, its decision-making biasesparticularly in the 1930s when it was strongly prounion and in the 1980s when it was strongly promanagement-has been a critical factor in determining the scope 482 POLITICS & SOCIETY of the act and the power of unions within them. 64 On civil rights matters, the Board has been fairly consistent in following the legislative history of the Wagner Act, which has meant to avoid confronting it whenever possible. No "duty of fair representation" existed in the Wagner Act, and the Board subsequently avoided interpreting such a duty for its first three decades, despite the fact that the Supreme Court indicated that such a duty ought to be presumed in union representation. 65 In a series of race discrimination cases during the 1940s and 1950s, the Board refused to decertify unions that excluded black workers and were unwilling to make racial discrimination an unfair labor practice. For instance, in 1945, the Board held that a racially segregated local was not an "issue of discrimination" because both white and black workers were being represented "adequately" by the union. 66 That same year, the Board certified an all-white union in Larus & Brother Co. and ruled that the exclusion of black workers from union membership was not a violation of the duty of fair representation.
67 While the Board declared that unions must act as "genuine representatives of all the employees in the bargaining unit," it also held that it had no express authority to remedy undemocratic union practices and that having a separate local on the basis of race "does not, in our opinion, constitute, per se, a subversion of representation." 68 Not only did the Board consistently refuse to deny union certifications in clear cases where racial discrimination was being committed by the union, it tended to see racism as simply the result of employer manipulation. It overturned union election results, for instance, when the employer used racial epithets to scare workers away from the union. In two southern cases-one where the employer claimed he would hire a "nigger, Cajun, wop or whatnot" if a union came in, and the other where the employer threatened that a "nigger" would head the incoming union 69 -the Board found these comments to be unlawful threats by the employers against workers: if they accepted the union "the employees would suffer enforced association with persons of supposedly inferior origins." 70 But in cases where union racism was found during election campaigns, the Board consistently found the actions to be incidental or harmless. As it declared in Maple Shade Nursing Home, Inc., in response to the use of racist epithets during the union organizing campaign, "I am reminded of an ancient line of Board cases that speak of union activities not being any form of tea party."
71 Similar rationale by the Board is given frequently, minimizing racist speech by the union as part and parcel of union organizing behavior, at times considering racially derogatory speech as "obvious ribbing." 72 The Board has been consistently reluctant, when asked either by courts or by federal officials, to extend its power to address civil rights matters. In the 1950s, as the Supreme Court debated extending the doctrine of fair representation to the NLRA, the Board's general counsel argued that the act's legislative history provided no provision that prevented the exclusion of racial minorities from bargaining agreements. 73 Shortly after the passage of the Civil Rights Act, the Board acted to rescind bargaining rights to unions that were found to be discriminating and later held that racial discrimination was an unfair labor practice. 74 But even after this decision, the Board has consistently stated, both in its decisions and in personal correspondence with other government agencies and elected officials, that it was the wrong agency to handle issues of racial discrimination and that it would defer on racial discrimination matters to the EEOC. For instance, in response to Senate questions about the civil rights enforcement capacity of the NLRA, Arnold Ordman, the Board's general counsel, responded, "The NLRA is primarily designed as a law concerned with problems of labor-management-relations and organizational rights rather than racial discrimination. On the other hand, Title VII . . . is aimed directly at racial discrimination. . . . I have deferred action in some cases on charges involving racial discrimination where charges have also been filed with the EEOC where it appears the Commission is actively investigating and if permitted to act might well be able to dispose of the case more expeditiously or more effectively than the Board would." 75 In the post-Civil Rights Act era, the Board's reluctance to engage in civil rights matters was dramatically exemplified in Emporium and Western Addition Community Organization, where it refused to separate civil rights activity from labor activity, allowing the termination of civil rights activists for violating labor law when they protested their union's reluctance to counter civil rights problems in the workplace. 76 The Board's policy culminated in Handy Andy, where it held that a plaintiff accusing a union of race discrimination should use Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, not the NLRA. 77 In allowing the certification of a discriminatory union to stand, the Board wrote, "A union that has discriminated actively in the past and still has a racial imbalance may be preferable for minority workers to no union at all. . . . Employers faced with the prospect of unionization will be provided and have been provided . . . with an incentive to inject charges of union racial discrimination into Board certification and bargaining order proceedings as a delaying tactic in order to avoid collective bargaining altogether rather than to attack racial discrimination."
78
The Board was not wrong to claim, as it did in both Emporium and Handy Andy, that civil rights matters cannot be viewed independently of class conflict and employer power. 79 But by consistently refusing to deal with civil rights matters, particularly in its active deferral to the EEOC on discrimination issues, the Board (and, more broadly, national labor policy) effectively separated labor rights and civil rights into separate agencies and jurisdictions, and, as a result, left unions vulnerable to administrators and judges with little knowledge or sympathy for the particularities of union politics. Not only would handling union discrimination outside of the NLRB be far more costly to unions 80 but unions put themselves in a position where antiunion forces would be in a better position to exploit exactly the Board's concerns in Handy Andy, but without having labor officials participate in the decision making.
POLITICS & SOCIETY UNION CIVIL RIGHTS POLICY THROUGH PATCHWORK: DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, AND FEDERAL COURTS
With the NLRB not playing a role in combating union discrimination, federal officials concentrated their regulatory efforts in two other agencies-the DOL and the various equal employment committees culminating in the 1964 creation of the EEOC. Neither of these agencies would be particularly effective, and both were severely limited in their ability to handle union civil rights. The DOL was too closely allied with labor unions and generally lacked a will to challenge those unions to enforce civil rights. The EEOC lacked enforcement power and thus relied on lawyers, sometimes through the Department of Justice but more often from the private sector, who filed class action lawsuits. These efforts would ultimately have an impact in integrating unions, but the principal actors involvedleaders at the EEOC and civil rights lawyers-often had little knowledge or interest in the specific class issues that surround unions. As a result, their efforts to integrate unions unintentionally contributed to significant union decline.
The Department of Labor
Founded in 1913, the DOL was seen at least until the Nixon Administration as a prounion agency. The agency's creation was championed by labor unions, and as Francis Rourke argues, because the agency lacked a coherent agenda and constituency, it found itself open to organized interests. 81 As a result, the agency has remained on the sideline for many of the major developments during the twentieth century, and not because of the department's own lack of ambition. During discussion of the Wagner Act's passage, the DOL's secretary, Frances Perkins, made a concerted effort (with the backing of the AFL) to include the new NLRB within the DOL's province. Before a Senate committee hearing, she argued, "Employeremployee relations and the problems of collective bargaining belong within the normal sphere of a Labor Department. . . . Unless the agency which deals with these problems is part of the Labor Department, there is danger that there will not be that constant integration of these problems with other labor problems, which is essential if the Department and the Board are to have the greatest possible understanding of the ramifications of their decisions and the greatest possible effectiveness." 82 John L. Lewis also endorsed DOL involvement, claiming the department as the "recognized branch of the Federal Government upon which labor can depend to represent its viewpoints."
83 But for exactly this reason, placing the NLRB within its auspices failed because they were not considered impartial enough for handling disputes over interference with the right to organize. 84 As Senator Lloyd Garrison stated in committee, putting the NLRB within the DOL would be "a vital error . . . not because the Labor Department would interfere with it . . . but solely because of the [unfavorable] impression on the public." 85 
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The DOL became involved in union civil rights affairs during the Kennedy Administration. Unfortunately, the Kennedy Administration's efforts only epitomized the failure of federal pressure to do anything about union civil rights prior to the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Much of its time was spent just trying to get an accurate account of the problem. 86 Though it was frustrated in this effort, what it found "indicates an extremely bad situation" in the construction trades. 87 When the department attempted to promote a nondiscrimination policy in apprenticeship and training programs, it met severe resistance. 88 (A parallel effort was taking place through the EEOC as it attempted to pressure unions to join a "Programs for Fair Practices"-it had similar difficulty in simply receiving responses from many of the major unions.) 89 At least some members of the department wanted a bigger role in union affairs and were concerned when the Kennedy Administration began to rely more actively on the Department of Justice to intervene. 90 The department also felt that the NLRB was the inappropriate avenue because it "is a quasi-judicial, independent agency and it would be inappropriate for other agencies of the Executive Branch to interfere," and concluded (perhaps, not surprisingly) that "it would seem almost essential, however, that future activities in this area be coordinated by the Department of Labor."
91
In 1965, President Johnson issued Executive Order 11246 mandating that all federal contractors take affirmative action to ensure equal employment opportunities, advertise their commitment to nondiscrimination, and file detailed reports describing their own employment practices. The DOL and its new Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC) would oversee government contractor efforts to meet hiring goals for each construction trade or at least show that they had made "good faith" efforts; penalties for failing to comply included disqualification from future federal contracts. Since construction unions operated their own hiring halls, their discriminatory behavior-even when acting independently from the contractor-could effectively exclude minority workers from jobs. But union dominance within the DOL enabled it to successfully fight enforcement-the OFCC in the DOL remained understaffed and underfunded, and it promoted vague plans that failed to create new jobs. 92 Jill Quadagno argues that the department's Bureau of Apprenticeship and Training, which was designed to spearhead affirmative action efforts in union apprenticeship programs, was "run like a union department." 93 In fact, early on in its failing efforts to promote integration in apprenticeship programs, DOL leaders looked for ways to defer their powers to the newly created EEOC so as to avoid embarrassment. 94 President Nixon's "Philadelphia Plan," an affirmative action program that created specific goals and timetables for federally funded construction trades in the Philadelphia metropolitan area, perhaps had the most potential of the government enforcement efforts. The plan, which began in June 1969, attempted to move black workers into six construction trades that all had abysmal minority hiring records. 95 It provided a designated time period of four years for contractors to 486 POLITICS & SOCIETY reach their goals for minority employment in all crafts. The goal was to have the percentage of qualified black workers in each covered craft equal to the percentage of black residents in the five-county area. The OFCC could cancel or suspend contracts or portions of contract and disbar unions from further federal contracts. By the end of the year, the OFCC reported that unions to date were doing "in effect, nothing!" 96 The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights stated that "the fact that the sanctions and penalties provided in Executive Order 11246 have been used so infrequently tends to undermine the credibility of the contract compliance program and thus reduce its effectiveness."
97 It did not get much better. In response to anger from contractors and unions, the Nixon Administration supported "hometown plans" negotiated by local contractors, local union representatives, and community organizations that were ineffective as they were not binding and limited in coverage. 98 DOL officials complained in 1971 that "it has become apparent that the implementation of Executive Order 11246 is and in the foreseeable future will continue to be, materially impeded by the failure of the unions involved to grant membership and provide employment referrals to minorities" and urged "appropriate legal action." 99 A New York City report in 1973 stated, "No juggling of statistics can hide the fact that the Plan fell far short of that goal. And besides . . . that goal was not nearly adequate." 100 A 1974 report by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights found the OFCC to have "taken virtually no enforcement action" and been largely ineffectual, calling the hometown plans "a failure." 101 OFCC statistics of the plans in five major cities found that thirteen of the sixteen targeted craft unions had fewer minority workers in 1973 than they had in 1971, while two of the others had an increase of only five workers.
102 Although most construction unions refused to cooperate, the OFCC rarely applied sanctions and did so only symbolically.
103

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Fair employment commissions were continually used by presidential administrations from Roosevelt through the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which created the EEOC. None of the commissions had much more than symbolic power, as all were hampered by southern opposition in Congress. In 1941, the Roosevelt Administration created the Fair Employment Opportunity Commission, (FEPC) and in 1943, it included a specific clause dealing with labor unions; but the FEPC was consistently weakened by southern opposition and eventually defeated in 1945. The AFL was a major opponent of the commission, aligning with southern Democrats in FEPC hearings that led to its defeat. 104 Without much more than investigative power, the FEPC nonetheless combined with the help of the War Board and state courts to pressure the Boilermakers Union to grant equality to its all-black auxiliary unions. 105 Truman and Eisenhower also used executive orders to promote fair employment programs, but only with the PAUL FRYMER 487 Kennedy Administration was it used to more actively address labor union civil rights. In part, this was because it was not until the late 1950s that the civil rights movement aggressively targeted union racism. The NAACP's labor department published a well-publicized report on union civil rights problems in 1960, and its labor director, Herbert Hill, spent the early 1960s aggressively attacking prominent national unions on grounds that they had systemic problems with discrimination. 106 With the civil rights movement at its height, a federal agency was finally passed over southern opposition in 1964. Although the DOL was unsuccessful with enforcement because of its ties to unions, the EEOC was seemingly up against even further odds. Passed after a fierce debate in the Senate, Republicans and southern Democrats succeeded in significantly weakening the power of the agency by denying it, among other things, cease-and-desist powers. Understaffed and underfunded, the agency immediately found itself backlogged and spent most of its time simply trying to get information from unions on the state of the problem.
107 Similar to the DOL, one of the EEOC's biggest struggles was simply gathering accurate statistics about the racial composition of unions.
108
But unlike the DOL, which was weakened by its strong attachments to organized labor, the EEOC was far more sensitive to civil rights groups and, perhaps most notably, to civil rights lawyers. 109 Because the EEOC and civil rights lawyers were not participants in NLRA-style collective bargaining battles, but instead were fighting to incorporate the rights of individuals and groups who are being excluded from those bargaining battles, their "reasoning and remedies differed."
110 There was a fear, as the DOL had about the Department of Justice's involvement (the Department of Justice could and did intervene at the EEOC's request for "pattern and practice" suits), that agencies not "sufficiently equipped with the requisite expertise in labor-management relations and related areas" might lead "those unsophisticated in the subtleties of labor-management relations to push for actions and remedies which may have undesirable repercussions in labor-management relations and in intra-union relations."
111 As David Feller, counsel for the UAW, wrote to Reuther, "Litigation in the field of employment rights has certain very special problems and must therefore meet certain specific standards. . . . It must be remembered that the universe of discourse in this area includes more than the NAACP and the unions. . . . If the NAACP attack on discrimination is converted into an attack on union organization it will inevitably be used by employers to defeat or weaken union organization, which in the end will obstruct rather than aid the achievement of job rights for Negroes." 112 This created an internal split among civil rights leaders and lawyers, as well, as Clarence Mitchell and Roger Wilkins of the NAACP, Bayard Rustin, A. Phillip Randolph, and others consistently struggled with the difficult effort of pursuing union civil rights while attempting to maintain an institution that potentially held great economic and political promise for the further pursuit of racial equality. 113 
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POLITICS & SOCIETY Although unions had been active in defeating amendments to the Civil Rights Act that would have made union discrimination an unfair labor practice, they nonetheless immediately found themselves a critical target of the new agency. 114 Union leaders quickly complained that they were not getting a fair hearing from the agency. When the agency seemingly exceeded its mandate with regard to union seniority provisions and color-conscious remedies, the AFL-CIO began to actively lobby for its further weakening in the mid-1960s. 115 The AFL-CIO's committee on civil rights found itself with little influence in the EEOC, often complaining that they never "heard back" from the agency when they asked about the state of the commission's activities with their local unions. 116 In 1975, the UAW complained that the agency continually failed to make distinctions between civil rights discrimination and labor grievances. William Oliver, who led the UAW's efforts to resolve union civil rights matters, criticized the agency for failing to explore more conciliatory measures before filing charges against the union.
117
Because the agency was understaffed and without enforcement powers, it relied extensively on lawyers and federal court decisions to carry out its mission, especially as its backlog of cases quickly became unmanageable. Judith Stein writes, for instance, that the NAACP's legal director Jack Greenberg told the EEOC that "his lawyers could do [their] investigatory work. Greenberg was less concerned with improving agency fact-finding and conciliation than with getting cases to court. He required only a pro forma run through the process . . . then he could sue."
118 Ironically, the EEOC's lack of enforcement powers quickly became one of its chief assets. "Because it lacks power," Alfred Blumrosen wrote based on his experiences working as an adviser for the agency, "conciliation can consist of 'helping' the respondent company or union avoid an uncertain but certainly unpleasant prospect of litigation conducted by private persons whom the government does not control."
119 Blumrosen was right about the simple threat of litigation, and in certain situations it seemed to work. The president of the Building Trades, Peter Schoemann, for example, backed off of his vocal opposition to affirmative action in 1968 (a year after he had vigorously attacked affirmative action as reverse discrimination and a threat to union quality and autonomy). He told members of the Building Trades that he was "persuaded . . . by the danger of exposing our local unions and apprenticeship programs to the so-called 'pattern or practice of discrimination'suits. . . . If we want to remain free . . . it is absolutely imperative that we institute affirmative action programs." 120 Lawsuits were his primary motivation in supporting an important civil rights policy: "You might think you have never seen a Negro applicant in your life, and you might be an honorable man, but this will not necessarily save your life if you become a defendant in one of those suits . . . if these suits continue over time, the Justice Department is bound to try all kinds of sociological legal theories, and attorneys tell me that if they try them often enough, they are going to win at least some of them." 121 The PAUL FRYMER 489 president of the Papermakers and Paperworkers Union similarly told members, "We are forced by the developments in the field of civil rights to make substantial and radical changes in our seniority, progression lines, promotion, and lay-off practices. . . . We must face the fact that unless we do what the law requires we will be bled to death financially." 122 Some union locals went bankrupt, and more offered to settle and sign consent decrees. In an effort to avoid "massive amounts of back pay," for instance, the United Steelworkers signed a nationwide consent decree to avoid the "unworkable and inconsistent rules written by judges" that "threatened bankruptcy of many local unions and severe crippling of the International." 123 More often than not, however, conciliation failed, as many unions resisted affirmative action efforts or the EEOC and private plaintiff lawyers demanded extensive sums of back pay and damages. 124 The number of cases in federal courts rose dramatically, and the litigation increase put great financial stress on unions, forcing even the most resistant among them to make civil rights advances.
125 AFL-CIO budgets for litigation costs doubled between 1966 and 1973, doubled again by 1979, and then quadrupled over the next four years.
126 But this reliance by civil rights groups to resolve union discrimination was a high-cost strategy, even if they were without a better option. Unlike a regulatory agency that subsumes much of the cost on itself in the name of mediation and a public good, federal court activity places a huge financial cost on the losing party. And while unions were clearly guilty of civil rights violations, if reformed, they remained one of the most promising ways to promote broader racial equality by providing significant economic and political advantages.
127 Federal courts too often ignored this element, seeing labor and civil rights goals as independent, and resolving them in a manner that had long-term implications on labor's economic health.
128
The Return of Courts in Labor Affairs
The fragmented and patchwork nature of federal civil rights policy also had an unintended consequence for the broader institutional position of courts and legislatures in labor policy making. The failure of the federal government to accomplish union civil rights helped lead courts back to the forefront of national labor policy. The Wagner Act had been important not just because it provided a substantial improvement in the lives of union workers; it also mattered because it provided the moment in American state building when the elected branches gained control of economic policy. 129 But by the 1970s, federal courts had again become widely involved in both micro-and macroeconomic policy. In some areas, such as the rights of individual "at-will" employees, courts and not elected officials have been at the forefront of the regulatory effort, finding protections for individual workers by using contract and tort law to revise at-will employment doctrine and using implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing.
POLITICS & SOCIETY
Civil rights was hardly the only reason for this return of the courts in economic policy making, 130 but it played a far bigger role than many people recognize. As mentioned above, the Supreme Court first intervened dramatically in labor civil rights matters in 1944 in the Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co. decision. The case is notable not just for its legal conclusions and implications but that it came out at a time when the Court was consistently protecting union autonomy and majority decision making in nonrace-specific cases on the grounds that not doing so would weaken the union's power as a unanimous body against the employer.
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Steele involved a union that came to a collective bargaining agreement that would have eliminated most of the jobs of its African American members. The Court held that "constitutional questions arise" if a statute confers on a statutory bargaining representative the right to discriminate against members of the bargaining unit. "The representative is clothed with power not unlike that of a legislature which is subject to with power not unlike that of a legislature which is subject to constitutional limitations on its power to deny, restrict, destroy or discriminate against the rights of those for whom it legislates and which is also under an affirmative constitutional duty equally to protect those rights." 132 While the majority decision stated that they were interpreting a statute, they emphasized a broader "duty to exercise power" by the union and a "duty toward those for whom it is exercised," all the while relying on Fourteenth Amendment precedents, the NLRA or its legislative history, for defense. 133 The same year, a California Supreme Court judge held against a union closed shop that denied membership on the basis of race, "Courts without statutory aid, may restrain such conduct by a union on the ground that it is tortuous and contrary to public policy."
134
What courts were arguing, and would continue to do so in a series of union civil rights cases both before and after the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, was what Justice Murphy, in the concurrence of Steele, had made clear-that union discrimination was a constitutional matter that trumped legislative declarations. 135 Its impact was dramatic for union civil rights cases. In decision after decision, federal courts used the Constitution and civil rights common law to weaken union and NLRA autonomy involving issues of seniority, collective bargaining agreements, union security, and administrative discretion. The Steele decision, as Karl Klare points out, "has become a prolific source of litigation in cases having nothing to do with race discrimination. It is of daily concern to union officials in countless situations entirely divorced from the civil rights context. Duty of Fair Representation (DFR) law has become today one of the primary vehicles of government intervention in the internal affairs of labor unions." 136 Further cases expanded the DFR enabling its extensive use in matters both related and unrelated to race. In Conley v. Gibson, a case that involved a union's discriminating against black employees, the Supreme Court extended Steele to the quality of representation for individual workers, while in Humphrey v. Moore, a seniority case not involving civil rights, the Court extended the possibility of using the DFR for a PAUL FRYMER 491 wide range on applications. 137 In Vaca v. Sipes, the Supreme Court ran around the NLRA's autonomy of rule making, because the preemption doctrine was not deemed "applicable to cases involving alleged breaches of the union's duty of fair representation." 138 In doing so, the Court held that federal courts had concurrent jurisdiction with the Board in hearing fair representation cases. DFR cases doubled between 1965 and 1970 and again by 1975. 139 As Reuel Schiller has remarked, "With the passive equal protection analogy transformed into a more aggressive examination of the bona fides of union activity, post-Humphrey courts would become involved in monitoring union activity with a degree of precision unknown in the 1940s and 1950s." 140 Courts also used broad and arguably creative interpretations of Title VII law to infringe on NLRA precedents. In Contractors Association of Eastern Pennsylvania v. Secretary of Labor, a federal appellate court chipped away at the right of unions to have exclusive hiring halls (and only a few years earlier upheld by the Supreme Court in a noncivil rights case) by finding on the basis of Title VII that the Philadelphia Plan was a legal intervention by the government into an area ordinarily governed by the NLRA. 141 In Quarles v. Phillip Morris, a federal district court held that Title VII could apply to union seniority provisions, even though legislative history reflected Congress's desire to protect seniority systems from the act: "Obviously, one characteristic of a bona fide seniority system must be a lack of discrimination."
142 In NLRB v. Mansion House Center, the Eighth Circuit overturned the Board in its decision to certify a union, again relying far more on constitutional than statutory grounds: "The remedial machinery of the National Labor Relations Act cannot be available to a union which is unwilling to correct past practices of racial discrimination. Federal complicity through recognition of a discriminating union serves not only to condone the discrimination, but in effect legitimizes and perpetuates such invidious practices. Certainly such a degree of federal participation in the maintenance of racially discriminatory practices violates basic constitutional tenets."
143 Thus, to remedy the NLRA's inadequacy on civil rights, federal courts used Title VII law, the Fourteenth Amendment, and even tort law to take broader powers away from unions and the Board altogether-powers that were often critical to union power such as seniority and hiring autonomy.
CONCLUSION
In 1965, before Senate hearings regarding whether to reform the NLRA by restoring union security agreements, AFL-CIO legislative director Andrew Biemiller made clear the union's recognition of a connection between NLRA and Title VII law: "Title VII . . . gives our unions some problems." He assured the committee that while the union supported enforcement of Title VII, it needed the reform of the NLRA union security provisions because it would make it difficult for racist workers to leave unions when they enact civil rights reforms: it will 492 POLITICS & SOCIETY "protect the union against resignations in the heat of the moment." 144 Biemiller may have recognized the connections between the NLRA and Title VII, but by 1965 this recognition had come too late. Too many racially segregated unions existed in the United States, and the process of integration would further splinter the national labor movement. Because unions were weaker politically than they were three decades earlier, there were far fewer supporters in Congress who were willing to promote a strong labor policy that could respond to the existing crisis. Union decline, aided by the defections among union members to the Republican Party and the subsequent efforts of the Reagan administration's NLRB to further undermine many key principles of union autonomy, spread precipitously in the following decades.
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Labor's civil rights problem is not the only explanation for union decline, but its importance has been overlooked as both an independent and contributing factor. In particular, it offers an important contributory factor to three existing explanations of union decline: the absence of resources for union organizing, the rise of business and the Republican Party during the 1970s and 1980s, and the resulting changes in labor law as interpreted by the NLRB in the 1980s. 146 Certainly, if racial conflict is attributed to organizational strength and the ability to win union campaigns, the discord over ending racial discrimination in the 1960s, as well as the sharp increase in financial resources needed by unions to fight constant court battles, coincides directly with the sharp decrease in union victories in certification elections during this time. Craft unions suffered particularly in this regard. Notable for their extensive discrimination problems and the fierce court litigation they faced, these unions suffered some of the most dramatic declines in the percentage of union election victories, winning just 56 percent of NLRB certification elections between 1972 and 1984, after having won nearly 95 percent of such elections in 1966. 147 More broadly, one does not need an extensive chain of events to link racial discrimination to the administration of labor law and policy. Not only did union election victories decline during this period but elections to decertify unions rose dramatically. White-labor support of George Wallace, Richard Nixon, and Ronald Reagan enabled Republican victories in the White House and led directly to the reforms by the Reagan NLRB that legal scholars have argued were profoundly harmful. 148 By the 1980s, even those unions that were not sites of civil rights conflict were nonetheless weakened by the changes in law and politics that hampered their abilities to mobilize new sectors of workers. As business interests pushed for further economic reforms to benefit free trade at the expense of unions, the union movement was too weak and too divided to muster much of a fight.
Union decline has further consequences for understanding American state building in the twentieth century. Most scholars either have completely ignored the role of race in an understanding of American political institutions, ideology, and culture or have understood racism as simply an irrational prejudice that is PAUL FRYMER 493 both separate from the regular functioning of American democracy and inconsequential for understanding our institutions. The American political development literature has provided some notable exceptions to this research approach, but as with other fields within the study of politics, the state-building literature remains separated between those few who study race and those who claim theoretical understandings of American politics without even the slightest attention to racial matters. 149 As this study shows, we cannot understand the significance and success of American policy making without attending to the importance of civil rights' exclusion. Even in those moments such as the 1930s when there is an absence of public discourse about race, its presence is often of great and lasting consequence.
I have emphasized three ways that the denial of racial equality has affected understandings of the New Deal and twentieth-century labor policy. First, it revises many of the standard accounts of the New Deal's place in the twentieth century and as a fundamental moment in the development of American liberalism. Civil rights is not so easily separable from an understanding of the New Deal, even if elected officials continually attempted to make such a separation in their acts of state building. Instead, this patchwork form of state building led agencies and laws to work in direct conflict with each other, and in the process, helped undermine many of the key principles of the initial New Deal effort. By seeing the state-building effort of the 1960s in conflict with that of the 1930s, moreover, it questions American political development scholars who interpret the civil rights movement as simply an effort by Democrats to finish the New Deal by extending economic principles to all.
150 Race was clearly a fundamental axis that was both separable and conflicting (rightly or wrongly) with the economic emphasis of the New Deal. Ignoring the independent significance of race both diminishes the importance of the 1960s as an era of fundamental "reconstructive" state building and gives too much importance to the New Deal.
Second, the government's response to racial inequality effectively brought the law "back in" to labor regulation. Labor is by no means the only place that this happened; court involvement in modern-day voting rights and election law, for instance, were heavily contingent on the Court's initial involvement through the civil rights struggles of the 1940s through 1960s, leading it to reinterpret definitions of party organizations and elected official behavior in a manner that diminished their once autonomy from legal oversight. Once courts become involved in labor policy making on matters of race, it is not a far leap to where they extend this involvement to broader questions previously handled by electoral officials. Courts have not only scaled back the NLRA, they have extended their influence to a wide range of employment matters, using tort and contract law to increase individual worker rights independent from legislative involvement. 151 Third, it emphasizes the importance of power in the process of institution building. The new institutional literature rose at a time when the power literature 494 POLITICS & SOCIETY was declining and it has distinguished itself from the latter's claim that institutions reflect specific societal interests and elite hegemony. 152 The new institutional literature has argued instead that the state was in important ways autonomous from any specific political or economic interest. 153 Recent studies have moved new institutionalism from its initial neo-Marxism to 'disjointed' pluralism, where decisions are not just seemingly made outside of any actor's intent or control, but inequalities of class, race and power are no longer recognized or discussed. I do not disagree that institutions can have autonomous impacts, and I have, in fact, made that argument here. But, the impact of institutions should not lead scholars to lose sight of the ways in which institutions manifest and promote powerful interests. In this case, white supremacists within Congress and the labor movement continually shaped the possibilities and limits of labor policy. The capacity of progressives in the New Deal appears to have been far overestimated. As Desmond King and Rogers Smith have well argued, by ignoring racism's importance as a real and enduring ideology and "order" in the United States, scholars have not simply missed the way that it is embedded in our institutions and political development, they have ignored a more profound point. 155 Racism has greatly limited the political influence of progressives and liberals in the twentieth century; success has been brief and piece-meal and both labor and civil rights groups will continue to confront this power dynamic as they work to remobilize in the twenty-first century. (February 17, 1961 Union leaders, in their effort to maintain that internal racism was not their fault, continually championed specific civil rights leaders, such as A. Philip Randolph and Bayard Rustin, who defended them against the charges coming from civil rights leaders. Rustin, for example wrote numerous defenses of the labor movement, attacking civil rights protestors such as the Coalition of Black Trade Unionists who he believed used strategies that harmed the broader union movement. Rustin was a powerful supporter of unions, and at times was championed by union leaders as seemingly representing the "black perspective." Continually, articles written by Rustin were forwarded by union leaders with attachments indicating their approval to supporters nationwide. In response to Bayard Rustin, "Fear, Frustration, Backlash: The New Crisis in Civil Rights," Dissent, March-April 1966, Jewish Labor Council chair Charles Zimmerman forwarded the piece with the attached note: "Of special interest to the JLC is the unmistakable evidence that poverty breeds racism and other forms of bigotry, and that it contributes significantly to the social evils that now plague our cities." Jewish Labor Council Papers, General Files, "Bayard Rustin," (December 1966). In response to Rustin's article ("The Failure of Black Separatism," Harpers, January 1970), Don Slaiman, director of the AFL-CIO Department on Civil Rights, widely distributed it with the note "I think this is one of the most thoughtful articles on the subject to date." Jewish Labor Council Papers, General Files, "Correspondence 1966." In response to Rustin's article "Blacks and the Unions," Harry Fleischman, director of the American Jewish League wrote that it is "one of the most perceptive and informational articles on this issue that I have seen in years." Jewish Labor Council Papers, General Files, "Bayard Rustin," Robert F. Wagner Archives, NYU Library. 43. Karen Orren writes of Laughlin Steel that the case "signaled the Supreme Court's final abandonment of common law ordering of personal relations and its deference to the legislative branch on matters of social policy." Karen Orren, "The Primacy of Labor in American Constitutional Development," American Political Science Review 89, June (1995 ):377 no. 377 (1975 : 379. Some argue that this break was less fundamental, arguing that federal courts quickly reintervened into union affairs, restraining union activity, particularly with regard to its right to strike. See Forbath, "Shaping of the American Labor Movement," 1232-33; Klare, "Judicial Deradicalization"; James A. Gross 51. The only mention of race and agricultural workers is by Vito Marcantonio on the House floor: "Unless the right to organize peacefully can be guaranteed we shall have a continuance of virtual slavery." Congressional Record 79 (June 19, 1935) : 9720. In response to the exclusion of agricultural workers, Robert Wagner commented that they were "excluded because I thought it would be better to pass the bill for the benefit of industrial workers than not to pass it at all, and that inclusion of agricultural workers would lessen the likelihood of passage." "Robert 
